header
Image from OpenLibrary

The role of corporate governance and earnings management in predicting bank riskiness / Sabah Abdelhakkam Alsayed Soliman ; Supervised Mohamed Hassan Abdelazim

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publication details: Cairo : Sabah Abdelhakkam Alsayed Soliman , 2021Description: 106 Leaves ; 30cmOther title:
  • دور حوكمة الشركات وإدارة ألارباح فى التنبؤ بمستوى المخاطر البنكية [Added title page title]
Subject(s): Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also as CD
Dissertation note: Thesis (Ph.D.) - Cairo University - Faculty of Commerce - Department of Accounting Summary: This research investigates the usefulness of corporate governance and earnings managementin predicting bank riskiness within an emerging market context.Board of directors' attributes and functionality are proxies for corporate governance. Earnings management ismeasuredusing a two-stage OLS regression which reflects the combined effect ofdiscretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary realized security gains and losses. Bank riskiness is reflected through two proxies; namely,Z-Score which is used as an accounting-based risk measureand stock return volatility whichis a market-based risk measure.Three prediction models of bank riskiness are testedwhile controlling for the bank-specific, regulatory, political and economic characteristics.The sample consists of 21 banks; including publicly traded and state-owned banks, during 2012-2018in Egypt.The first model examinesthe ability of corporate governance to predict bank riskiness.The second model reflectsthe ability of earnings management topredict bank riskiness.Finally, the third modelinvestigatesthe impact of the interacting effect betweencorporate governance and earnings management onbank riskiness.Results indicatethat the second prediction model; the earnings management model, has the highest prediction power in case of an accounting-based risk measure.However, the third model; the interaction model, is the best in predicting bank riskiness in case of a market-based risk measure. Moreover, results reveal that bank riskiness decreases with the CEO/chairmanduality and increases with board size, foreign board directorship, and executive board directorship.Interestingly, the market reacts negatively to female board directorship. Additionally, where earnings management induces more riskiness, corporate governancediscipline banks by attenuating their riskiness
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Holdings
Item type Current library Home library Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Thesis Thesis قاعة الرسائل الجامعية - الدور الاول المكتبة المركزبة الجديدة - جامعة القاهرة Cai01.05.02.Ph.D.2021.Sa.R (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not for loan 01010110083198000
CD - Rom CD - Rom مخـــزن الرســائل الجـــامعية - البدروم المكتبة المركزبة الجديدة - جامعة القاهرة Cai01.05.02.Ph.D.2021.Sa.R (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 83198.CD Not for loan 01020110083198000

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Cairo University - Faculty of Commerce - Department of Accounting

This research investigates the usefulness of corporate governance and earnings managementin predicting bank riskiness within an emerging market context.Board of directors' attributes and functionality are proxies for corporate governance. Earnings management ismeasuredusing a two-stage OLS regression which reflects the combined effect ofdiscretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary realized security gains and losses. Bank riskiness is reflected through two proxies; namely,Z-Score which is used as an accounting-based risk measureand stock return volatility whichis a market-based risk measure.Three prediction models of bank riskiness are testedwhile controlling for the bank-specific, regulatory, political and economic characteristics.The sample consists of 21 banks; including publicly traded and state-owned banks, during 2012-2018in Egypt.The first model examinesthe ability of corporate governance to predict bank riskiness.The second model reflectsthe ability of earnings management topredict bank riskiness.Finally, the third modelinvestigatesthe impact of the interacting effect betweencorporate governance and earnings management onbank riskiness.Results indicatethat the second prediction model; the earnings management model, has the highest prediction power in case of an accounting-based risk measure.However, the third model; the interaction model, is the best in predicting bank riskiness in case of a market-based risk measure. Moreover, results reveal that bank riskiness decreases with the CEO/chairmanduality and increases with board size, foreign board directorship, and executive board directorship.Interestingly, the market reacts negatively to female board directorship. Additionally, where earnings management induces more riskiness, corporate governancediscipline banks by attenuating their riskiness

Issued also as CD

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.